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The paper argues that the concept of trust is inevitably latent in every 
contractual relationship, and is best understood as a comprehensive theory 
and justification of contract law as both trust and contracts (more than any 
other legal action) are aiming toward the same universal goal of cooperation, 
risk-taking, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations.  Contract law, per se 
and through its “good faith” doctrine, could then function as an expressive, 
coercive, and thus corrective legal tool, serving to symbolize, build, and 
internalize a culture of trust wherever it has failed to develop.  Accordingly, 
while viewing the corporation as a nexus of contracts and as a voluntary 
organization based on cooperation and consent, trust can thus function as an 
axis that best fits corporate law, and also serves to justify it.
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2Introduction
Trust is the notion underlying the fulfillment of promises and expectations in contract 
law. Enforcing the promises implicit in a contract (Restatement, Second, Contracts, 
sec. 1),1 and protecting the expectation interest of a promise (Restatement, Second, 
Contracts, Sec. 344 [a])2 reflect this understanding.3 The expectation created in the 
wake of a promise implicit in the contract, which is usually the highest expression of 
trust, is thus the quintessential feature protected by contract law. Moreover, the 
voluntary relationships established during the negotiations preceding the contract and 
at the time of its signing and implementation constitute the most prevalent form of 
social and economic engagement, raising expectations and inviting mutual trust. 
Every contract can thus be considered a microcosm that, in its broadest sense, 
reinforces the “social” contract and draws on it. Respectively, protecting the value of 
trust in the context of contract law conveys the core attitude of the law to the idea of 
trust itself. This emphasis, creating a bridge between contract as a legal concept and 
1 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 1 (“contract defined”) – “A contract is a promise or a set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy…”; see also C. Fried, Contract as Promise
(Harvard University Press, 1981).
2
 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 344 (“Purposes of Remedies”):
“Judicial remedies under the rules stated in [the Restatement of Contracts] serve to protect one or more 
of the following interests of a promisee:
1.  His ‘expectation interest,’ which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being 
put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed,
2.  His ‘reliance interest,’ which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by 
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had 
the contract not been made, or
3.  His ‘restitution interest,’ which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has 
conferred on the other party.”
3
  For one definition of “trust” see D. Gambetta, ed., Trust [New York, 1988], p. 217 (“Trust (or, 
symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses 
that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such 
action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it 
affects his own action…[W]hen we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly 
mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to 
us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.”).  For another 
definition and for a recent comprehensive sociological theory of trust see P. Sztompka Trust: A 
Sociological Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1999) (“Trust is a bet about the future contingent 
actions of others” – at p. 25). 
3trust as a social concept, while both aim to reach the same universal goal of 
cooperation, risk- taking, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations, is the gist of this
article. This pragmatic insight, including its wider implications, can be applied to 
corporate organizations to view them as a nexus of contracts. Could this insight 
function as the long-sought missing link in the chain representing descriptive and 
prescriptive research in corporate law?
In his recent and original paper, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus 
of Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm,4 Eisenberg brings fresh insights and 
examples to demonstrate his contention that the usual conception of the corporation as 
a nexus of contracts is, inter alia, “…[u]nsatisfactory as a positive—that is, 
descriptive—matter, lacks intellectual coherence, and gives rise to unsatisfactory 
implications.” One of Eisenberg’s main arguments against the contractual view of the 
corporate organization rests on a view claiming that trust and loyalty between
corporate actors is an ideal goal of corporate law, but a problem prevails regarding the 
internalization of these norms in the context of contractual relationships: 5
If all corporate actors fully internalized the social norm of loyalty and gave 
full effect to that norm, the costs of both legal sanctions and monitoring-and-
bonding systems would be unnecessary, and the levels of loyalty would be 
much higher than those sanctions and systems can achieve. Accordingly, 
whatever the law does do to increase the force of the social norm of loyalty, 
and further its internalization, will lead to greater efficiency. Whatever the 
law does to diminish the force of the social norm of loyalty, and lessen its 
4
 24 Iowa J. Corp. L. 819, 835.
5
 See also M. A. Eisenberg Corporate Law and Social Norms 99 Columbia L. Rev. (1999) 1253, 
1274. This argument is based on B. Chapman’s article Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate 
4internalization, will lead to diminished efficiency. Authentic loyalty can run 
to an organization, or at least to the group of individuals that inhabit an 
organization, but it’s not likely to run to a set of contracts.
Blair & Stout suggest a somewhat similar argument, claiming that contract law 
encourages parties to be self-interested, whereas fiduciary law encourages them to be 
other-regarding; hence, a relationship cannot be both fiduciary and contractual at the 
same time.6
In this article, I support the view that considers “trust” a crucial and efficient 
concept in the analysis of social, economic, human, and humane interactions but, 
contrary to Eisenberg and to Blair & Stout, I will argue that the concept of trust is 
inevitably latent in every contractual relationship, and is best understood as a 
comprehensive theory and justification of contract law.7 If so, and rather surprisingly, 
the answer to Eisenberg’s concern may be found in the “problem” itself: contract law 
as a whole, and particularly its “good faith” doctrine, might be the main and most 
direct legal tool (complementing other social methods) for internalizing the social 
Fiduciary Obligation 43 Univ. of Toronto L. J. (1993) 547, which also challenged the contractual 
model of the corporation based on the concept of trust.
6
 M. M. Blair & L. A. Stout Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law 
(Georgetown Working Paper No. 241403, August 2000).
7
 The claim that the corporation is a set of contracts, and even that “contracts and fiduciary duty lie on 
a continuum best understood as using a single, although singularly complex, algorithm”, was already 
well established by F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty 36 J. of Law 
and Economics (1993) 425, and their article The Corporate Contract 89 Colum. L. Rev. (1989) 1416. 
Still, the authors did not adduce that the concepts of fiduciary law, contract law, and corporate law all 
share one theory. In that sense, my argument, claiming that the notion of trust provides a 
comprehensive theory of contract law, embodied in every contractual setting and helpful in its 
understanding, refines the explanation lacking in the model of Easterbrook and Fischel (Compare, R. 
Romano Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, ‘Contract and Fiduciary Duty’ 36 J. of Law and 
Economics (1993) 447). For a view that attacks the “elusive notion of trust” based on its non-
calculativeness see O.E. Williamson Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization 36 J. of Law 
and Economics (1993) 453, and R. Craswell On the Uses of ‘Trust’: Comment on Williamson, 
‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’ 36 J. of Law and Economics (1993) 487.
5norm of loyalty.8 Respectively, in a view of the corporation as a nexus of contracts 
and as a voluntary organization based on cooperation and consent, trust can thus 
function as a (universal) axis that best fits corporate law, and also serves to justify it.9
Intuitively, trust appears as a crucial, and possibly axiomatic, element in any 
human interaction, including the performance of large organizations based on the 
cooperation of many constituencies.10 The integration I suggest between corporations, 
contracts, and trust, however, still lacks this immediate intuitive resonance. Common 
wisdom tends to view legal contracts and even legal regimes in general, as an artificial 
substitute ensuring cooperative behavior between people when trust, as a cultural-
sociological-psychological concept, seems to be missing.11 Yet, this very substitution, 
pointing to both trust and contracts (more than any other legal action) as aiming 
toward the same universal goal of cooperation, risk-taking, and fulfillment of 
reasonable expectations, makes it possible to infer a reciprocity between contract as a 
legal concept and trust as a social concept. Contract law, per se and through its “good 
faith” doctrine, could then function as an expressive, coercive, and thus corrective 
legal tool, serving to symbolize, build, and internalize a culture of trust wherever it 
has failed to develop. 
Given that contracts are a basic, and probably universal, legal tool, the concept of 
trust as a comprehensive theory of contract law (see infra Part I), and the view of the 
8
 In other words, if corporate law is mainly about norm management, using contract law to substantiate 
a culture of trust sounds promising. 
9
 This claim targets Dworkin’s “super” judge Hercules, which deals with a “theory” that best fits and 
justifies most of the formal argument, and “must construct a scheme of abstract and concrete principles 
that provide a coherent justification for all common law precedents and…. Constitutional and statutory 
provisions as well” (R. Dworkin Hard Cases 88 Harv. L. Rev. (1975) 1057, 1094).
10 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny Trust in Large Organizations 87 
The American Ecomo,ic Review 333; F. Fukuyama Trust (New York, NY, Free Press, 
1995).
11
 See, for instance, the quotation by Eisenberg and F. Fukuyama, Id. (Hebrew version at p. 44, 193); 
L. E. Ribstein Law v. Trust 81 Boston U. L. Rev 553, 556 (“..[l]aw substitutes for rather than 
complements trust”).
6corporation as a nexus of contracts, could function as the missing link in the 
descriptive and prescriptive inquiry of corporate law and its dilemmas. Indeed, as a 
vast organization, and especially in a multinational and global economy, the 
corporation seriously challenges most traditional legal concepts and principles 
(including, among others, property law,12 criminal law,13 and constitutional law14). 
Contract law, however, is different. As a significant socio-economic organization 
involving many constituencies, the corporation supplies clear and strong evidence for 
a trust theory of contract law, and can also substantiate an atmosphere of trust rather 
than merely benefiting from it. In this sense, the corporation might be described as the 
quintessential embodiment of contract.
This article is organized as follows. In Part I, I briefly consider the essential role 
of trust. Although trust is discussed in this article as a crucial concept in the corporate 
arena, some interdisciplinary insights about the “axiomatic” necessity of trust will be 
cited in order to substantiate its systematic and universal role. The major theoretical 
claim of the article will then be outlined, namely, that the concept of trust serves as a 
comprehensive theory of contract law. Emphasis will also be placed on the “good 
faith” principle developed in contract law during the last few decades. Since the claim 
is that contract law is justified and also serves as the main legal bridge toward 
substantiating the social norm of trust, especially in the modern global economy, 
reference will also be made to the recent literature discussing the interaction between 
social norms and the law, as well as the internalization of social norms within the law. 
12
 M. J. Horwitz The Transformation of American Law 1870-1960, The Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy
(Oxford University Press, 1992), 166
13
 This is the case with the attribution of criminal liability to an artificial entity such as the corporation 
(see, for example: P.L.Davies Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law (Sixth ed., London, 
1997) at pp.229-232.
14 D. Meir-Cohen Persons, Organization and the Bill of Rights (1986); Horan Contemporary 
Constitutionalism and Legal Relationship between Individuals 25 Int. Comp. L. Q. (1976) 848, 860; 
7In Part II, I illustrate the integration of the concept of trust within contract law and 
corporate law in some recent decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, which applied 
the “good faith” principle (mainly in the corporate context) and used other legal 
techniques to substantiate the social norm of trust in the corporate context. Israeli 
precedent resorts rather extensively to the “good faith” doctrine of contract law in 
corporate contractual settings, explicitly justifying this recourse by reference to the 
trust principle, and stressing the implicit obligation of the corporation and its organs 
to fulfill the reasonable expectations of all corporate actors. This experience can 
provide an interesting point of departure for future research. In other words, this part 
will demonstrate the reciprocity between contract law, corporate law, and trust as a 
descriptive and prescriptive concept, and the potential uses of contract law as a legal 
tool for the internalization of trust, by conveying the goals of contract law and by 
using its remedies to entrench cooperation and trust. In Part III, I point out some 
preliminary thoughts concerning specific issues in corporate and securities law that 
seem best suited for a research project based on the trust theory of contract and 
corporate law outlined here. Although the focus of this article is on a relatively 
abstract claim, which I hope may prompt a new research direction in corporate law, 
some initial discussion will be attempted regarding the applicability of the thesis 
presented here to various corporate matters. These matters include issues of 
comparative corporate law, the search for an efficient corporate governance structure, 
the scope of mandatory rules in corporate law, and legal methods for the protection of 
mixed investors within a corporate law model of shareholders supremacy. In addition, 
the applicability of trust theory to the area of corporate law can help to crystallize the 
justification and content of the disclosure philosophy in securities regulation, and may 
Carl J. Mayer Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights 41 Hastings Law 
8also supply us with a consistent and predictable application of the doctrine of 
“piercing the corporate veil.” Part IV concludes with a discussion about the potential 
role of the corporation in generating an environment of universal trust, which is 
crucially important in the global economy in general, and within the context of the 
virtual Internet world in particular. 
I. The Universal Concept of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract Law
and its Internalization as a Social Norm
A.  The Universal and “Axiomatic” Role of Trust
Since countries differ greatly on such aspects as their constitutional and legal regimes, 
their economic and social institutions, their culture, and so forth, it is only natural to 
expect them to vary concerning the legal rules governing corporate issues, including 
the structure of corporate ownership.15 Any inquiry into intellectual history, however, 
shows that some ideas do seem to bear larger universal significance,16 and this is also 
the case concerning the notion of trust.17 Cultural and legal differences 
notwithstanding, trust seems to be, socially speaking, an all-pervading, universal 
concept (“The importance of trust derives directly from the nature of human beings as 
social animals who can only satisfy most of their needs by means of coordinated and 
Journal 577.
15
 L. A. Bebbchuk and M. J. Roe A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and 
Governance 52 Stan. L. Rev. 127 (1999).
16
 Such as, for instance, the ideals of the French Revolution, or the principles of the “Bill of Rights.”  
17As an anecdote and in order to illustrate the broad and yet basic nature of the concept of trust, it 
might be interesting to cite the following passage from a swimming-instructions manual: “Asked what 
the single most important factor is in learning to swim, most people would reply ‘Confidence.’ A sense 
of trust—what we have called being at home in the water—provides the foundation for us to do 
whatever else might come naturally in the water”(S. Shaw and A. D’Angour The Art of Swimming: 
In a New Direction with the Alexander Technique [Ashgrove Pub., Bath, U.K., 1996] at p. 89).
9cooperative activities”18; “High trust among citizens accounts for the superior 
performance of all institutions in a society, including firms”19); economically 
speaking (“It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the 
world can be explained by the lack of mutual confidence”20); and psychologically 
speaking (Trust is a central ingredient of the “healthy personality”21). More 
specifically, and closer to the thesis of this article, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny emphasize the relevance of the concept of trust in the area of 
large corporations:
Higher trust between people in a population should be associated with 
greater cooperation. These views of trust share an important implication, 
namely, that trust should be more essential for ensuring cooperation 
between strangers, or people who encounter each other infrequently, than 
for supporting cooperation of people who interact frequently and 
repeatedly. In the latter situations, such as families or partnerships, 
reputations and ample opportunities for future punishment would support 
cooperation even with low levels of trust. This implies that trust is most 
needed to support cooperation in large organizations, where members 
interact with each other only infrequently because they are only rarely 
involved in joint production…. In sum, trust enhances economic 
18
 S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters Social Principles and the Democratic State (London, 1977), at p. 279.
19
 F. Fukuyama, Supra note 10.
20
 Kenneth J. Arrow Gifts and Exchanges Vol. 1 (No. 4) Philosophy and Public Affairs (1972) 343, 
357.
21
 Erickson E. H. Identity, Youth, and Crisis, [New York, 1968].
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performance across countries…. Trust promotes cooperation, which is 
most important for large organizations.”22
B. The Concept of Trust as a Comprehensive Theory of Contract Law
The purpose of this part of the paper is to substantiate the claim that the concept 
of trust can serve as a comprehensive theory of contract law.22a Moreover, since most 
of our daily actions are based on consent, reciprocity, and cooperation, and are hence 
subject to contract law, contract law can be viewed as the most social as well as the 
most basic legal foundation.23 A harmonic perspective will then be suggested, 
whereby the principle of good faith will also be viewed as drawing its vitality and 
contents from the basic justification or overarching theory shedding light on contract 
law in general—the notion of trust.24 From this perspective, the principle of good 
faith and contract law (and possibly, even law in general) are both construed as 
relying on the pivotal concept of trust. This strategy might be helpful in identifying 
the principle of good faith as part of a whole, and as a means for attaining trust 
whenever eroded in pre-contractual or contractual settings. It may also contribute to 
the consistent implementation of contract law by lawyers and courts, including its 
whole range of rules and instruments, thus ensuring certainty and stability. Trust also 
plays a crucial role in strengthening confidence and reliable expectations, and is a 
22
 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny Supra note 10.
22a
 For a different view see: D. Kimel From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of 
Contract (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003); D. Kimel Neutrality, Autonomy, and Freedom of Contract
21 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2001) 473, see pp. 489-493; D. Kimel Remedial Rights and 
Substantive Rights in Contract Law 8 Legal Theory (2002)313, see pp. 325-328.; A critique of this 
view: Anthony Bellia Jr Promises, Trust, and Contract Law 47 American Journal of Jurisprudence 
(2002) 25-40.
23
 Sec. 61 to the Israeli Contract Law (Contracts (General Part) 5733-1973) express this notion by 
applying the concepts of contract law on every legal action, even if not contractual in its nature. See 
also S. I. Benn and R. S. Peters, Supra note 18, at p. 279 which describe “… the nature of human 
beings as social animals who can only satisfy most of their needs by means of coordinated and 
cooperative activities”
24
 For concrete examples of this claim, see the next part.
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vital element when individuals consider, before acting, whether to commit themselves 
to a move whose results depend on the future performance and cooperation of the 
other party. In these circumstances, the availability of the good faith principle as a 
complementary corrective standard to which the legal system can resort for 
maintaining trust in unforeseen situations is highly desirable.25 The legal system will 
thereby promote a culture of trust in the context of contract law that will encourage 
ease, increase safety and confidence levels, and improve planning ability at all levels 
of interaction and commitment.26
Accordingly, while striving to create and strengthen trust both expressively and 
coercively, whether through conventional contract law or through the principle of 
good faith,27 we will also see the institutionalization of a stable socio-economic 
culture that encourages cooperation. An additional and no less important aim is also 
thereby achieved, namely, the flourishing of personal autonomy and mutual respect. 
In this article, the close bond between the notions of trust and reasonable 
expectations is highlighted. The notion of “trust” is thus upheld as representing the 
most adequate comprehensive theory, both descriptive and prescriptive, for the 
justification of contract law. First, the notion of trust is already implicit in other 
justifications of contract law and, at the very least, justifies their existence. Second, 
the voluntary relationships established during the negotiations that precede the 
contract and at the time of its signing and implementation constitute the most 
prevalent form of social and economic engagement, raising expectations and inviting 
mutual trust. Every contract can thus be considered a microcosm that, in its broadest 
25
 This claim can be used to extract more coherent standards for filling gaps occasionally found in 
contracts, based on the trust theory of contract law.
26
 Since trust is crucial for shaping and maintaining our social and economic quality of life, striving for 
its attainment will, in itself, lead to the stability and certitude so sought after in the legal realm in 
general, and in contract law in particular.
27
 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 1, 205, Supra notes 1 and 86 (respectively).
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sense, reinforces and draws from the social contract. Respectively, protecting the 
value of trust in the context of contract law conveys the core attitude of the law to the 
idea of trust itself. 
Third, trust is the notion that stands behind the fulfillment of promises and 
expectations in contract law.28 Enforcing the promises implicit in a contract, and 
protecting the expectation interest29 (particularly through the remedy of “specific 
performance,” which is a central remedy in breach of contract) reflect this 
understanding. So does the extension of contract law to promises that are essentially 
non-commercial.30 The expectation created in the wake of a promise implicit in the 
contract, which is usually the highest expression of trust, is thus the quintessential 
feature protected by contract law.31
Fourth, the close association between contracts and the notion of trust can also be 
inferred from the “interchangeable” nature of the relationships between them. If we 
could expect, formulate, and implement detailed contracts that contend with all 
situations and developments without transaction costs, trust would be redundant, 
whereas in a world where total trust prevails between people, contracts would be 
unnecessary. We might therefore conclude that detailed contracts, the recourse to 
courts in general, and the frequent use of the good faith principle in particular, do not 
necessarily follow from stability, certitude, and trust, but possibly from the absence of 
these values, and can thus act directly and potentially to strengthen them. 
Fifth, a contract is, by definition, a meeting of wills integrating, as it were, the 
intentions of two or more parties. This understanding is relevant to laws regulating the 
28
 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 1, Supra note 1..
29
 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 344(a), Supra note 2.
30
 As is the case in Israel, for instance, concerning promises involving surrogate mothers and political 
coalition agreements.
31
 C. Fried, Supra note 1.
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formation of contracts through the mechanics of “offer” and “acceptance,” as well as 
to laws concerning the interpretation of contracts, which are meant to expose the 
parties’ intentions and their shared aims. Essentially, the contract is a mutual desire 
for exchange and cooperation and, as such, creates mutual relationships of power and 
subordination that, in turn, the law recognizes as reflecting fiduciary relations.32
Finally, the view of trust as the comprehensive theory of contract law may serve 
as a consistent explanation for the existence of consumer legislation in contract law, 
which is generally perceived as compulsory legislation. The increasing might of 
economic bodies and their alienation from clients more deprived than them 
concerning access to information and economic resources explain the need for 
intervention, given that contracting in these areas could also lead to abuses. The 
principle of “let the buyer beware” is thus exchanged for one where the risk is 
assumed by the seller, for the sake of preserving trust and fulfilling expectations in 
contractual situations characterized by high incentives to breach them.
C. The “Expressive” and “Coercive” Functions of Contract Law As a Bridge toward 
Trust as a Social Convention
“Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probability
with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a 
particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or independently of his 
capacity over to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own 
action.33 Hence, the origin (or destination) of trust belongs in the psychological 
32
 Compare: T. Frankel Fiduciary Law 71 Calif. L. Rev. (1983) 795.
33
 D. Gambetta, Supra note 3 ” [emphasis added].
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perception of expectation and confidence.34 Such a perception, however, is inevitably 
affected by, and contingent on, external circumstances and cooperative behavior. The 
perspective of trust is twofold, and includes subjective and objective dimensions. 
Subjectively, trust is a psychological concern that is crucial for the “healthy 
personality”,35 but objectively, trust is socially and economically valuable in 
promoting cooperation and risk-taking.36 This twofold perspective of the notion of 
trust raises a question concerning methods for internalizing trust within the law. In 
sum, since “trust” is unquestionably a social norm37 as well as a psychological 
perception, the main dilemma is whether the law can authentically substantiate (“the 
‘complement’ function of law”) this duality.38 My response is that contract law is the 
legal domain most deeply anchored in trust and can thus serve, expressively and 
coercively,39 as a bridge toward an atmosphere of trust, at least as a social 
convention.40 On these grounds, and given that social norms penetrate everyday life 
and are revealed as meaningful to legal analysis for a variety of reasons,41 a 
discussion about definitions and explanations is in place at this point. The discussion 
will focus on the potential influence of law on social norms and will also be a preface 
34
 As noted, Erikson considered trust “[a] central ingredient of the ‘healthy personality’” (Supra note 
21).
35
 Erickson, Ibid .
36
 In a sense, trust is a unique social norm that, unlike other social norms that we expect to find in a 
given society, trust concerns the psychological perception of expectation itself.
37
 Melvin A. Eisenberg Supra note 5 (Eisenberg uses the term “social norm of loyalty”).
38
 A different view appears to be current now, namely, that the law affects trust artificially (the 
“substitute” function of law), see L. E. Ribstein Supra note 11 and the text to notes 4-6. 
39
 For an attitude that views contract law as a coercive device see Eric A. Posner Law and Social 
Norms (Harvard University Press, 2000) at p. 160: “The purpose of contract law is to enable parties to 
have the government penalize both if they have a dispute; and contract doctrines merely give parties a 
reliable way to indicate ex ante their desire for such government involvement, and to limit the size and 
the variance of the penalty to something close to what should be sufficient: a finger rather than a head”.
40
 Compare: C. Marks & L. Mnookin, “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior” 11 Journal of Legal Studies (1982).
41
 For detailed arguments see: Richard H. Mcadams The Origin, Development, and Regulation of 
Norms 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338.
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to Part II, which illustrates how Israeli contract law has incorporated the social norm 
of trust both expressively and coercively.  
The term “social norm” can be understood in several ways. For the purpose of 
this article, the simplest definition is the most appropriate: a social norm is a social 
attitude of approval and disapproval, specifying what ought and what ought not to be 
done.42 Yet, a critical question remains open: what are the interrelations between law 
and social norms in general, and between contract law and trust in particular?  
Robert Cooter argues that effective laws must align with the morality already 
internalized by citizens.43 While Cooter holds that costs are typically more responsive 
than internalized values to law and public policy, he also holds that the state affects 
the values internalized by the citizens. Once citizens respect the law, they habitually 
obey it in their daily lives without reflecting on it. Thus, a just state achieves stability 
by generating its own support among reflective citizens. In other words, according to 
Cooter’s theory, citizens are more willing to do their civic duty because the state 
changes this duty in a way that increases its moral appeal. If that is so, and if we 
accept Erickson’s psychological theory about the significance of trust as a basic 
component of human personality,44 we must conclude that the law plays an important 
role in encouraging the promotion of trust.  
Another question that concerns Cooter touches on the ways that are available to 
the law in order to bring citizens to internalize values. According to Cooter, just as 
states must reward citizens in order to promote the internalization of civic virtue, the 
state must also infer character from behavior. The problem is that, due to its size, the 
42
 Cass R. Sunstein Social Norms and Social Roles 96 Colum. L. Rev. 903.
43Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens ? An Economic Analysis of Internalizing Legal 
Values (U.C. Berkeley Law and Economics, working paper series, working paper 2000 – 8) (published 
in 86 Virginia L. Rev. 1577).
44 Supra note 21.
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modern state is restricted in its ability to identify virtuous citizens. Inferring character 
from behavior requires intimate knowledge of the person, but officials in large states 
are far removed from most citizens, and the character of each citizen is thus relatively 
opaque to state officials. Consequently, officials lack the information needed to 
reward people for acquiring civic virtue, and instead of rewarding or punishing 
character, state law mostly rewards or punishes acts. According to Cooter, the state 
can rely on families, friends and colleagues in order to reward civic acts. Compared to 
the state, people involved in intimate relationships are relatively good at inferring 
character from behavior. Consequently, the primary influences on character are 
intimate relationships, and states should therefore refrain from attempting to instill 
civic virtue directly, instead prompting family, friends, and colleagues to do so. 
Insofar as their families, friends, and colleagues prefer relationships with civic-
minded people, individuals have an incentive to cultivate civic virtue. Civic acts can 
thus become signs of the possession of the moral traits that people tend to seek in 
partners in cooperative ventures. To achieve this goal, the state must first align law 
with the social norms that facilitate private cooperation. This point is important for 
our discussion: if we consider contracts are “intimate” relationships, and if we view 
the corporation as a microcosm of a social community and as a system of intimate 
relationships depending on private cooperation, then Cooter might support the view 
that contracts and corporations can be an efficient and intimate tool for promoting the 
internalization of a culture of trust. 
Elsewhere, Cooter attempts to lay the foundation for an economic theory of 
“expressive” law.45 According to the expressive theory of law, the expression of 
45Robert Cooter Expressive Law and Economics 27 J. Legal Stud. 585 ( 1998 ) 
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social values is an important or, possibly, the most important function of the courts.46
For Cooter, the law can create a focal point by expressing values, which could tilt the 
system toward a new equilibrium, and creating focal points is the first expressive use 
of law. In addition, the law can change the individual values of rational people. 
Internalizing a social norm is a moral commitment that attaches a psychological 
penalty to a forbidden act. A rational person internalizes a norm when commitment 
conveys an advantage relative to the original preferences and the changed preferences. 
By creating opportunities for pareto self-improvement, the law induces rational people 
to change their preferences. Cooter analyzes how the law can tilt aggregate behavior 
and change individual preferences by expressing values. Changing individual values 
is the second expressive use of law. 
Cooter points to several ways in which the law can change preferences such as, 
for instance, using the coercive sanctions attached to acts. Concerning the present 
argument, Cooter shows how contract law creates opportunities for pareto self-
improvement. Cooter’s example is highly relevant to the claim of this article, since 
both assume an interaction between contract law as a legal device and cooperation as 
a social concept. Cooter’s argument proceeds as follows: assume that the state 
chooses whether or not to enforce contracts, and the actor chooses whether to be 
honest or dishonest. According to economic analysis, social sanctions for dishonesty 
are not very effective regarding the promises under consideration; consequently, given 
that there are only social sanctions and no legal sanctions, the immediate benefit from 
dishonesty outweighs the future cost. The gain from dishonesty largely offsets the 
modest social sanction so that, in the absence of contract law, dishonesty is more 
profitable. People have difficulty cooperating with each other without enforceable 
46
 See Cass R. Sunstein Symposium: Law, Economics, & Norms : On the Expressive Function of Law
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contracts, resulting in relatively low productivity; in contrast, when bound by 
enforceable contracts people are more cooperative, resulting in relatively high 
productivity. Both honest and dishonest people, then, enjoy a larger payoff with 
contract law than without it. With contract law, the sanction for dishonesty is social as 
well as legal and legal sanctions for dishonesty are effective concerning the promises 
under consideration so that, overall, honesty yields a higher payoff than dishonesty.
The dishonest person prefers the high present payoff and the low future payoff 
resulting from dishonest behavior, rather than the low present payoff and the high 
future payoff from honest behavior, while the honest person prefers the opposite. In 
the absence of contract law, pareto self-improvement is impossible, so that a dishonest 
person and an honest person prefer to remain as they are rather than change their 
preferences. The main point, however, is that contract law produces a different result. 
State sanctions make dishonesty less attractive. Contract law creates a situation in 
which a person who shifts from being dishonest to being honest is better off relative to 
his initial and final preferences. Thus, contract law creates the opportunity for pareto 
self-improvement, where none had existed without contract law. In general, the law 
prompts improvement in character wherever a legal sanction creates an opportunity 
for pareto self-improvement. Adding to Cooter’s model the possibility of legal 
liability, monetary sanctions, and stigma through the “good faith” principle in cases of 
trust breaching, can make his claim even more convincing, especially when accepting 
the internalization theory of Richard Mcadams’ “esteem model.”47
144 U.Pa. L. Rev . 2021 and infra text to notes 50-51.
47
 Mcadams identifies the desire of individuals for respect or prestige, that is, for the relative esteem of 
others, as an initial force behind norm creation. See Richard H. Mcadams Supra note 41. For the 
sanction of shaming in the corporate context, see D. A. Skeel Shaming in Corporate Law (Forthcoming 
in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2001).
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Lisa Bernstein cites the diamond industry as a unique example of the preference 
of contractual relations.48 As she shows, the diamond industry has systematically 
rejected state-created law. In its place, the sophisticated traders who dominate the 
industry have developed an internal, elaborate set of rules, complete with distinctive 
institutions and sanctions, to handle disputes between members of the industry. 
Bernstein’s research is largely devoted to explaining why the diamond industry has 
for so long relied on extra-legal enforcement for its business norms. By a variety of 
reputational bonds, customary business practices, and arbitration proceedings, the 
diamond industry has developed a set of rules and institutions that its participants find 
clearly superior to the legal system. This industry, as traditionally organized, has been 
able to make its own rules and, more importantly, enforce them. The market is 
organized to promote low cost and rapid dissemination of information about 
reputation. This enables it to use reputation bonds to create intra-industry norms that 
function as a deterrent to breach of contract, and a private sanctioning system whose 
judgments can be fully enforced, almost invariably, outside the legal system. As 
Bernstein suggests, mores and institutions in the diamond industry developed for 
reasons wholly unrelated to shortcomings in the legal system; yet, even as the force of 
the old enforcement mechanisms of religion and secondary social bonds began to 
disintegrate, a network of trading clubs designed to promote the dissemination of 
information about reputation and socialization among members emerged to fill the 
gap. The fact that generations of diamond dealers have clung to nearly identical intra-
industry norms in countries with a wide variety of legal rules and institutions suggests 
that the traditional rules and institutions are likely to be efficient from the perspective 
of market insiders.              
48Lisa Bernstein Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond 
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Though unique to a specific community, Bernstein’s model can inform the 
argument of this article. A general perception of corporations as small and 
sophisticated microcosms, possessing their own institutions and their own 
mechanisms for character-forging and enforcement, could emphasize the potential of 
such intimate communities to affect human behavior and culture.49 Just as the concept 
of trust prevails, through voluntary and contractual arrangements, in an environment 
as materialistic and business-oriented as the diamonds’ industry, we could infer its 
applicability, through contractual mechanisms, to other organizations and 
communities. 
Finally, and as noted, the literature extensively concerned with social norms 
concentrates on the expressive function of law, “the function of law in making 
statements,” as opposed to controlling behavior directly.50 Given that the expressive 
(beside the “coercive”) function of contract and corporate law in promoting trust is 
well identified in Israeli Supreme Court opinions (infra, Part II), some remarks in this 
regard are in place here. 
Cass Sunstein emphasizes that, in general, actions are expressive because they 
carry meanings.51 As is true for nearly all our activities, from the most mundane and 
up to the most significant, this is also true of the law. Sunstein suggests that the 
expressive function of the law is closely related to the effects of the law on prevailing 
social norms, given the rough analogy between the social and legal levels. He claims 
Industry 21 J. Legal Stud 115 ( 1992 ).   
49
 [The role of compliance Programs/code of ethics - September 2001 – returning to the compliance 
area, the Sentencing Commission announces that it is considering refinements in the Corporate 
Sentencing Guidelines’ compliance provisions.  Looking back, the Commission notes that the 
“guidelines have had a tremendous impact on the implementation of compliance and business ethics 
programs over the past then years.  [They] prompted a serious reconsideration within the American 
business community of methods and rationale for improved corporate governance” J.M .Kaplan, “The 
Sentencing Guidelines: The First Ten Years” Ethikos, Novemvber/December 2001…]
50 Cass R. Sunstein Supra note 46.
51 Ibid.
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that a society might identify the norms to which it is committed and insist on those 
norms via the law. Accordingly, one of the clearest expressive functions of the 
“statement” made by the law may be to affect social norms and, thereby, ultimately 
affect both judgments and behavior: a law that is appropriately framed may influence 
social norms and thrust them in the right direction. 
In sum, the literature identifies a largely reciprocal relationship between law and 
social norms. Arguably, the most important aspect of the relationship between norms 
and the law is the law’s ability to shape norms. Strong and convincing arguments are 
advanced about expressive and coercive ways through which the law can shape social 
norms, and about the voluntary establishment of commercial communities 
characterized by a high level of trust implemented through the contractual 
mechanism.52 As far as contract law, corporate law, and trust are concerned, I claim 
that trust serves as a comprehensive theory of contract law and as a highly influential 
factor in the area of corporate law. The “expressive” and “coercive” opinions of the 
Israeli Supreme Court provide a good illustration of this claim, and this is the topic of 
Part III. 
III. The Integration Between Trust, Contract Law, and Corporate Law:
The Israeli Experience
This part will illustrate developments in the Israeli reality of corporate and securities 
law, as they are affected by the trust principle in general and by contract law in 
52 In a recent article, Bernstein illustrates the complimentarity between trust and contract, and how 
they have also lead to cooperation also in the cotton industry: L. Bernstein Private Commercial Law in 
the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions 99 Michigan Law 
Review (2001) 1724.
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particular.53 A review of some decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court pointing to the 
reciprocity between corporations, contract law, and trust could prompt research into 
methods based on concepts of contract law potentially useful for internalizing 
(expressively and coercively) a culture of trust in the corporate arena.  
53
 Since this article concentrates on contract law, the illustrations discussed in this part deliberately 
overlook classic corporate cases, insofar as they are grounded on classic corporate fiduciary duties.
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A. The Application of the “Good Faith” Principle in Contract Law 
in the Context of Corporations
One of the most useful doctrines of contract law, which is used to emphasize the trust 
relations created by contractors, is the concept of “good faith” during the negotiation 
process (which applies to everyone involved, even if not intended to be a party to the 
contract and even if contract was not achieved at the end) and during the contract’s 
performance.54 This concept is also well established in the American legal system.55
The Israeli Supreme Court has used this principle to induce people to fulfill the 
reasonable expectations of their counterparts by instituting, for example, requirements 
of disclosure and other forms of cooperative behavior. Sanctions for breaching this 
obligation usually include monetary compensation and  involve a stigma, which 
induces people to obey this duty ex ante and, hopefully, helps them to internalize this 
norm. These opinions are usually accompanied by explicit normative statements about 
the inherent trust relations created by contractual and pre-contractual relations, and 
the significance and benefit inherent in the concept of trust:
54
 Sections 12 and 39 in the Israeli Contract Law (Contracts (General Part) 5733-1973), deals with 
negotiation and performance in good faith:
Sec. 12 -  “(a) In negotiating a contract, a person shall act in customary manner and in good faith.
(b) A party who does not act in customary manner and in good faith shall be liable to pay 
compensation to the other party for the damage caused to him in consequence of the 
negotiations or of the conclusion of the contract, and the provisions of section 10, 13 and 14 
of the Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law 5731-1970 shall apply, mutatis 
mutandis.”
Sec. 39 – “An obligation or right arising out of a contract shall be fulfilled or exercised in customary 
manner and in good faith”. On the rationale of these two sections, the Supreme Court said (in C.A. 
207/79 Beit Yules Ltd. V. Raviv Ltd. P.D. 37 (1) 533, 543: 
“This instruction (in section 12 of the Israeli Contract Law), imposes special ‘relationships of trust’ on 
the participants in the contractual negotiations, thus expanding contractual trust, originating in Section 
39 of the Israeli Contract Law, toward the pre-contractual stage. The obligation to conduct negotiations 
in the accepted way and in good faith means that the participants in the negotiation must behave 
honestly and fairly toward each other. They are no longer “strangers” to one another; rather, the law 
creates a “closeness” between them leading to expectations , and imposes a duty of consideration.”      
55
 Restatement, Second, Contracts, Sec. 205, Sec. 1-203 to the Uniform Commercial Code.
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1. Eximin S.A. (a Belgian Corp.) v. Textile ve-Hanhala Itel Stile Ferrari Ltd.56
In this trailblazing decision, bearing on a contractual conflict between two 
corporations, former Chief Justice Shamgar applied the good faith principle and 
formulated the doctrine of “contributory fault” as part of the law of contract so as to 
encourage a culture of cooperation between contractors. In order to induce this 
practice, Chief Justice Shamgar made the respondent legally liable to disclose and 
cooperate ex ante in order to prevent the damage that eventually occurred. The facts 
were quite simple: the appellant, a Belgian corporation, bought jeans boots from the 
respondent, an Israeli corporation, in order to market them in the US. The respondent 
manufactured and sent the goods to the US, where they could not be marketed 
because the boots’ name involved a breach of a trademark. The appellant suffered 
monetary damages and sued the respondent. The legal question was how to allocate 
the contractual risk for the breach of the trademark, and whether the contractual 
responsibility needs to be an absolute responsibility. Chief Justice Shamgar’s 
expressive rhetoric about the economic benefit of cooperative behavior and its 
harmony with contractual interaction is worth citing:
Is achieving the aims of the law dependent on the existence of absolute 
responsibility? The opposite is true. As in any contract or negotiation, the 
basis of the sales deal is the parties’ wish to cooperate, obviously assuming 
that cooperation will benefit both of them, separately and together. There is 
no reason to assume that this cooperation will end with the signing of the 
contract,… but it is plausible that, along their shared path, the parties will 
face problems that might require a certain level of flexibility and even a 
56
 C.A. 3912/90, P.D. 47 (4) 64.
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departure from what was determined a priori. Cooperation will 
unquestionably also be required in the future. One aspect of this cooperation 
is the understanding that damages might be caused to one of the parties due 
to a lack of good faith displayed by both parties. In such a case, 
“cooperation” will be manifest in a division of responsibility for the 
damages between the two parties, a division that, a posteriori, will actually 
encourage cooperation a priori.
(Ibid., p. 81)
Elsewhere in the decision, Chief Justice Shamgar emphasized the direct link 
between the good faith principle in contract law and the principle of trust:
The concept of trust and the concept of legal good faith appear to be closely 
related. Both concepts share an identical foundation: at the basis of the 
sociological concept of trust is the possibility of every individual to assume 
that his plausible expectations from the other or from an institution will be 
fulfilled, and that the latter will behave according to what is required by their 
situation or their role. At the basis of the concept of good faith is the 
possibility of every individual to assume that his plausible expectations from 
the legal relationship in which he is involved with the other will be fulfilled…
(Ibid., p. 83)
Since this dispute involved Israeli and foreign corporations, we may easily infer that, 
in an era of global trade and economy, the application of such a contractual principle 
can also give impetus to a universal culture of trust.
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2. Penidar, a Corporation for Investment, Development, and Building Ltd. v. Castro57
This well-known Israeli Supreme Court decision held that a corporate organ is 
personally liable for any inactive misrepresentation it made during a contractual 
negotiation with a corporate customer. This decision, considered so important that it 
was followed by a rare legal proceeding involving a further hearing before an 
enlarged panel of judges, also relied on the “good faith” principle in contract law. 
Former Chief Justice Shamgar, joined by present Chief Justice Barak, upheld this 
decision, which deviates from the classic limited liability principle of corporate law, 
and expanded the responsibilities of the corporate manager toward corporate 
constituencies (the corporate customer) other than shareholders. The main explicit 
reason for the court’s decision was the personal responsibility of every human being 
as a social character—even if he/she a corporate organ and even if he/she is not 
intended to be a formal side of the contract he is negotiating for—to obey and 
substantiate an atmosphere of trust that was developed and expected in the course of 
the contractual negotiation process: 
The basis of section 12 in the [Israeli] Contract Law is the relationship of 
trust that must prevail between parties involved in negotiations 
conducted with the aim of signing a contract. Contractual trust is thereby 
expanded, based on section 39 of the [Israeli] Contract Law, to cover the 
pre-contractual stage.58
And elsewhere:
57
 (Additional Hearing) 7/81, P.D. 37 (4) 673.
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This step creates a proper dogmatic infrastructure for responsibility 
according to Section 12 of the law. It expresses a legal policy 
determining a level of behavior that is based on trust and fairness, 
incumbent on everyone engaged in actual negotiations toward the 
making of a contract, whatever his function.59
3.  Tefahot, Mortgage Bank Ltd. v. Sabach60 and Eliahu Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
Yashar61
Some of the most important and frequently cited Israeli legal decisions that applied 
the “good faith” principle have involved major corporations, such as banks and 
insurance companies.62 These decisions imposed on the corporations heavy disclosure 
burdens toward their customers and, again, were explicitly justified through the 
concept of trust. 
In the case of Tefahot, Mortgage Bank Ltd. v. Sabach, the court dealt with the 
question of whether the bank had a duty to disclose to its clients, who had borrowed 
money from the bank for the purpose of buying houses built by a company that was 
also one of the bank’s big debtors, that the bank knew about the building company’s 
financial problems. When the building company could not perform its obligations, one 
of the bank’s clients sued the bank claiming that the bank had breached its duty to 
disclose the problems affecting the building company. Accordingly, the client asked 
to waive his duty to return the loan to the bank. The court was aware that the 
disclosure duty owed to one customer involved facts about the financial circumstances 
58
 C.A. 230/80, P.D. 35 (2) 713, 724.
59 Ibid., at p. 703.
60 P.D. 48 (2) 573.
61 P.D. 49 (2) 749
62
 Most of these decisions were issued by former Chief Justice Shamgar.
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of another customer, but emphasized the socio-economic significance of banks, and 
the trust and expectations the public places in them. Respectively, the court attributed 
a “role of trust” to the bank and read the bank’s disclosure duty into its good faith 
obligation, in the name of trust: 
The prevalent approach is that the duty of disclosure exists as a matter of 
routine between parties about to enter a contract, even without a special 
relationship of trust between them but by virtue of the trust created between 
the parties to a negotiation… The bank has a duty of disclosure to its clients 
about essential details by virtue of the duties of trust imposed on it, even 
beyond the obligations incumbent on parties to a regular contract. Yet, as the 
scope and level of the duties of trust differ from case to case and from 
service to service, so does the scope and level of the duty of disclosure. 
(Ibid., pp. 596-597)
Another case concerned an insurance company that had promised a client, before 
sending him the written contract, that the terms of insurance for his trucks would be 
identical to those stipulated in a former insurance policy issued by another company
(Eliahu, Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Yashar). After the client’s trucks were stolen, the 
insurance company claimed that the specific security device required in the written 
insurance policy was not the one that the client had installed in his trucks and, 
therefore, he was not insured. Chief-Justice Shamgar described the client as a “simple, 
unsophisticated man, a laborer who trusts his fellows,” and stated that the insurance 
company has a duty to issue explicitly warnings and disclose facts that might affect 
the reasonable expectations of its contractual partners:
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The relationships created between the insuring company and the client 
should not be seen as the usual contractual relationships created through 
sales deals. A basic difference prevails between these two situations: in the 
latter, very broad discretion is ascribed to the parties’ will and, when 
estimating their wishes at the time of their meeting, we consider them 
equals…. This is not the case when at stake is the contract between an 
insurance company and a client…. Not only are the parties required to be 
more open than in other types of contract, but we are also strict with them 
concerning preciseness and meticulousness in the formulation and, 
obviously, in the implementation of agreements…. Our system has adopted 
and developed a principle of mutual openness even prior to the anchoring of 
the doctrine of good faith in civil legislation…. The legislative innovation in 
sections 12 and 39 of the [Israeli] Contracts Law paved the way, concerning 
our issue, for shifting from the realm of passive sincerity and openness to the 
imposition of operative liabilities…. In sum, an insurance company trying to 
limit the scope of its liability must ensure that the client is indeed aware of 
these limitations. 
(Ibid., p. 764)
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B. The “Public-Private” Distinction in Contract Law in the Context of Corporations
The tendency to use contract law to internalize social norms in general, at least 
expressively, became evident in Israeli law in recent contract law cases, which 
imported social values and “public” norms into “private” interactions.63 What is 
interesting is that this social and public viewpoint was also incorporated into the realm 
of the classic private law of contracts, mainly when corporate contractors were 
involved. In other words, the court recognized the semi-public orientation of giant 
corporations and their significance as social agents that affect the business culture and 
social culture of the society.64 Although this legal tendency is not unique to the social 
norm of trust, yet it shows how the Israeli Supreme Court uses contract law and 
corporate actors as instruments serving to internalize social values and concepts.
C. Corporate Charter as a Form Contract
Another interesting case recently discussed in the Israeli Supreme Court (by an 
expanded seven judges panel) decided that the charter of a specific cooperative 
corporation should be classified as a “form contract,” and ruled it should be 
exposed to wide legal scrutiny.65 The “form contract” category indicates that 
relationships with consumers failed to involve negotiations. Obviously, once a 
charter is placed in this category, it is easier for the court to intervene and revoke 
sections of the organization’s bylaws considered one-sided. As noted, although 
consumer law is sometimes mandatory, it can be justified and interpreted as part 
63
 Such as the Basic Laws: Freedom of Occupation, and Human Dignity and Freedom. See, for 
instance, C. A. 294/91 Kadisha Co. v. Kestenbaum P.D. 46 (2) 464; C.A. 239/92 Egged v. Mashiach
P.D. 48 (2) 66.
64
 This is also the rationale to sec. 239(d) of the new 1999 Israeli Corporate Law. This section binds 
publicly held corporations to nominate, among its outside directors, at least one man (if all other 
directors are women) or at least one woman (if all other directors are men). 
65
 C. A. 1795/93, 1831/93, The Egged Pension Fund v. Yaakov P.D. 51 (5) 433.
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of contract law through the concept of trust.66 Respectively, the possible consumer 
classification of asymmetrical contractual relations between the corporation and 
its constituencies seems to substantiate the claim that contract law is used to 
encourage an atmosphere of trust in the area of corporate law.
D. Trust as a Main Justification for the Securities Law
Finally, and even if not directly as part of the conventional contract law, we could 
consider a recent trend in the Israeli Securities Law, which deals with giant and 
publicly-traded corporations. The court’s opinion is justified mainly in regard to 
the confidence of local and international investors in the Israeli capital market,67
and is evident in almost every section of the Securities Law. This is the case 
concerning the liberal approach of the Israeli Supreme Court when applying the 
disclosure requirements of the Securities Law,68 concerning the court’s liberal 
approach toward the scope of the legal authority invested in the SEC and the 
Stock Exchange, concerning its liberal attitude when approving class actions on 
securities, and concerning its broad interpretation of criminal offences in the 
securities code. This trend illustrates that the compulsory legal regime affecting 
securities in contractual relations with corporations, through an impersonal and 
diversified capital market, aims to reinforce a culture of trust, especially when 
other market mechanisms fail in the attempt to foster such an atmosphere.69
66
 See text to Supra note 32 and text to Infra notes 71-72.
67
 See, for example, C. A. 218/96 Iskar Ltd. v. SEC (21/8/97, unpublished), at sec. 23. The same 
rationale might also explain the 1991 Sec. 46b. amendment to the Israeli Securities Law, which
restricted dual-voting structure in publicly held corporations.
68
 As noted in section A.3 , there is an obvious link between disclosure and trust.
69
 In R.C.A. 4556/94 Tetset v. Zilbershatz P.D. 49 (5) 774, Chief Justice Barak implied this notion: 
“Our economy differs from the American one, and our law differs from American law. Whatever the 
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III. Initial Thoughts About Possibilities of Research in Corporate Law and 
Securities Law Based on the Trust Theory of Contract Law
This article focuses on a claim that is relatively theoretical. Nevertheless, in this part I 
consider some preliminary thoughts about selected issues in corporate law and
securities law that seem most appropriate for a research endeavor based on the trust 
theory of contract and corporate law suggested above.  
First, since contract and trust are basic, universal concepts, a trust theory of 
contract and corporate law could supply comparative and descriptive explanations 
consistent with the path dependence theory of corporate law,70 and based on the levels 
of trust prevalent in each country. These explanations would address the issue of why 
countries differ in their corporate governance structures, in their corporate law, and in 
the level of protection granted to corporate constituencies.71 Trust theory will 
hypothesize that, in low trust countries, corporate ownership structure was initially 
developed in a way that exposed corporate constituencies to exploitation. Trust theory 
will also hypothesize that these countries will have, or ought to have as a 
complementary tool, more compulsory contract and corporate law, as well as stronger 
legal protection for corporate constituencies.72 Second, and relying on the last 
law in the United States, I… hold that in order to attain the aims of a class action suit, in Israel we 
should also allow the sophisticated investor to file a class action suit.”
70
 L. A. Bebchuk and M. J. Roe, Supra note 15; R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. 
W. Vishny, Supra note 10.
71
 Given that trust is also a behavioral attribute, we can draw a cross-cultural analogy between low and 
high-trust countries on the one hand, and Kohlberg’s psychological model of individual moral 
development on the other (see: H.A Michener & J.D. DeLamater Social Psychology (Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Publishers, USA, 1994) at p. 73). Kohlberg’s model begins with moral judgments based on 
external, physical consequences of acts, and proceeds to moral judgment based on social consequences 
of acts, and moral judgments based on universal moral and ethical principles. Since this individual
progression through three levels of moral reasoning (each one involving two stages) is universal, and 
depends, inter alia, on culture, this model can also be applied, collectively speaking, to a society.
72
 It might be interesting to check the correlation between the thesis presented here and the 
comparative findings presented in R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A, Shleifer Corporate 
Ownership Around the World 54 J. of Finance (1999) 471-517; R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A, 
Shleifer and R. Vishny Investor Protection and Corporate Governance 58 J. of Financial Economics 
(2000) 3-27 ; S. Johnson, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer Tunneling 20 American 
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (2000) 22-27.
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argument, the concept of trust supplies normative criteria for determining, even in one 
country, when corporate rules should or should not be mandatory,73 analogous to what 
is known as “consumer legislation.” The hypotheses and the analogy assume that trust 
also serves to explain the presence of compulsory consumer legislation in contract 
law, which is generally perceived as enabling legislation. The growing might of 
economic bodies and their alienation from more deprived constituencies as far as 
information and economic resources are concerned explain the need for intervention 
when a trust culture is lacking, since contracting might lead to abuses in these areas. 
The principle of  “let the buyer beware” is thus exchanged for one where the risk is 
assumed by the seller, for the sake of preserving trust and fulfilling expectations in 
contractual situations characterized by high incentives to breach them.74 This 
argument supports, for instance, the much more pronounced tendency to rely on 
mandatory rules for the regulation of public corporations characterized by dispersed 
and passive investors than for their private counterparts. This is also true of other 
issues involving the temptation to effect significant transfers between shareholders 
and managers, or between minority shareholders and the controlling shareholder, or 
issues that externalize risks in other constituencies.75 These actions encourage 
breaches of trust and, therefore, should usually be subject to mandatory regulation. 
The notion of trust can also help to justify the mandatory nature of the exception to 
the limited liability principle in corporate law (the doctrine of “piercing the corporate 
veil”) and anticipate when the court will implement it even in voluntary settings.  
73
 The issue of contractual freedom in corporate law is a fundamental issue in the theory and practice 
of corporate law; the literature on this subject is thus very extensive, and it was also the theme of a 
symposium issue in Columbia Law Review 89 (1989).
74
 For a perception of modern corporate and securities law as part of consumer law, see E. Bukspan 
About the Linkage of the Foundation Constituting Corporate Law, Consumer Law and Standard Form 
Contracts 44 Hapraklit (1999) 314 (in Hebrew).
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Namely, personal liability will be imposed whenever corporate organs or 
shareholders, which were involved in corporate contract or negotiation, have breached 
the reasonable expectations they raised on the other party.76
Third, trust theory, as a comprehensive theory of contract and corporate law, can 
shed more consistent light on the justification of full mandatory disclosure in the 
securities law. Because disclosure is a crucial way of attaining trust, reducing risks 
and providing incentives to cooperate, the need for disclosure requirements in 
publicly traded corporations, characterized by investors’ diversification, inferiority, 
and rational passivity, is easily explained.77
Fourth, the application of trust theory as a comprehensive theory of contract law 
in the context of the multiple consent relationships prevalent among all corporate 
actors could provide corporate managers with a coherent instrument for balancing the 
reasonable expectations of all contractual constituencies associated with the 
corporation. Moreover, the concept of trust can provide a consistent and holistic frame 
for the contents of the well-known  “Business Judgment Rule” without sacrificing the 
shareholder supremacy goal of corporate law, because all other constituencies in a 
typical corporation implicitly expect this rule and take it into account ex ante when 
they enter the corporate scene. Since the supremacy goal of residual claimants’ (i.e., 
75
 It is worth notify that my thesis supports an argument similar to that of Bebchuk, although on 
different grounds (see: L.A. Bebchuk Limiting Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable 
Constraints on Charter Amendments 102 Harv. L. Rev. (1989) 1820).
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 As the Israeli experience demonstrates, one way of cementing an atmosphere of trust in the 
corporate context is to ascribe personal contractual liability to corporate players vis-à-vis their 
corporate constituencies. There are rare precedents for this liability in corporate law, in the doctrine of 
“piercing of corporate veil.” As noted, trust theory could supply a coherent justification for such rulings 
in the future.
77
 Compare: L. Brandeis Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use it (1914) ch. 5 (“Publicity is 
justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman”). C. A. Williams The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and Corporate Social Transparency 112 Harv. L. Rev. (1999) 1197. Similarly, and as 
shown in Part II, section D, the rhetoric of trust (protecting investors’ confidence in the capital market) 
has been the prevalent legal justification in recent decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court concerning 
issues settled in the 1968 Israeli Securities Law. 
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shareholders), which is short for the goal of maximizing corporate value, is an 
“existentialist” attribute required for the corporation’s survival, it affects the 
reasonable expectations of the typical corporate voluntary constituencies.78 Balancing 
the contracts of all corporate constituencies does not mean that enforcing one contract 
will necessarily sacrifice the reasonable expectations of other constituencies, although 
it may at times hurt their interests. Respectively, a legal regime that directs corporate 
managers to maximize corporate value without neglecting their obligation to meet the 
reasonable expectations of all corporate constituencies, might settle the purported 
conflict surrounding the role of the corporation in the modern society (the  “property 
conception” of the firm v. its  “social-entity conception”).79 It may also be more 
effective in improving efficiency and strengthening the drive toward cooperation 
among various constituencies than the traditional conception guiding managers to 
concentrate only on the myopic interests of shareholders since the corporation, as an 
organization based mostly on voluntary and contractual interactions, can reap 
enormous benefits by relying on trust.80 In other words, the traditional agency 
literature of corporate law, which views the shareholders as the main corporate 
constituency, is unrefined and less than optimal, as it is not broad enough in 
addressing the expectations of other corporate constituencies in particular, and the 
78
 Compare: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman The End of History for Corporate Law 89 Geo. L. J. 
(2001) 439. The equation of the shareholders’ residual interest with  the corporate value of profit 
maximization led classic corporate literature to conclude that the most efficient allocation of voting 
rights is to shareholders (in the one-share-one-vote scheme) and to analyze in its light the efficiency of 
other corporate governance issues (F. H. Easterbrook and D. R. Fischel The Economic Structure of 
Corporate Law (Harvard Univ. Press, 1991)).
79
 Trust, then, will serve as a harmonic balancing tool between corporate constituencies, in a way that 
will circumvent the so-called “schizophrenic conception” of corporate law; see: W. T. Allen Our 
Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation 14 Cardozo L. Rev. (1992) 261.
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 Paradoxically, a culture of trust that takes into consideration the reasonable expectations of 
corporate constituencies might act as a bonding signal and prove most efficient for shareholders as 
well. For an efficiency argument for trust relations between employees of a firm, see R. Chami and C. 
Fullenkamp Trust and Efficiency (Oct. 1999) (SSRN, Electroniv Library). This paper is part of a larger 
project on the role of trust in market organizations and the interaction of both market and non-market 
organizations.
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basic idea of trust relations and commitment implicit in any contractual obligation in 
general. In that sense, when we endorse the approach of the “nexus of contracts” to 
corporate law, and the notion of trust toward all corporate players, we proceed along a 
more holistic and integrative path regarding issues of corporate law, including the 
goal of protecting investors in a global economy. In sum, the core of the typical 
corporation, as a business microcosm, is concerned with the goal of maximizing 
profits. This declared goal is the basic and most common expectation of a typical 
corporation upon its formation, and is implicitly accepted by all corporate players. 
Unlike the state or other public organizations, corporations are not usually subsidized 
by public resources. Pure social and altruistic goals, therefore, failing to ensure 
priority to the goal of profit maximization, will be ultimately self-destructive to the 
corporation and all its constituencies, not only to the shareholders. The concept of 
shareholder primacy reinforces this basic expectation from the corporation and its 
organs, because shareholders are the residual claimants, and their most homogenous 
interest is the only one that always correlates with the profit maximization goal of the 
corporation.81 In this respect, the conclusion in Kraakman and Hansmann’s recent 
work, The End of History for Corporate Law,82 appears plausible, namely, that the 
shareholder primacy model of corporate law is today so undisputable that it represents 
the “end of history” for corporate law.83
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 The survival and prosperity of the corporation are obviously in the best interest of all corporate 
constituencies. In any event, most corporate constituencies at present are also residual claimants in 
other corporations in their other capacities, such as investors in pension funds.  
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 Kraakman and Hansmann, Supra note 78.
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“[t] he basic law of corporate governance – indeed, most of corporate law – has achieved a high 
degree of uniformity across these jurisdictions, and continuing convergence toward a single standard 
model is likely…Chief among these pressures is the recent dominance of a shareholder-centered 
ideology of corporate law among the business, government, and legal elites in key commercial 
jurisdictions. There is no longer any serious competitor to the view that corporate law should 
principally strive to increase long-term shareholder value” (Id, p.1); “The triumph of the shareholder-
oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is now assured, even if it was 
problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago” (Id., p. 32). 
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Yet, the shareholder primacy model, even if it marks the  “end of history” for 
corporate law, is also the beginning of a new research path in corporate law. In some 
sense, the shareholder primacy model is too narrow, even from the shareholders’ own 
perspective, if it ignores the expectations of other corporate constituencies and their 
willingness to optimize cooperation. For a long time, scholars of law and economics 
focused on the shareholder primacy model and ignored the corporation’s interest in 
preserving loyalty toward other constituencies, as if it these interests were mutually 
exclusive. In contrast, a realm of trust, which is implemented in every contract, 
implicitly binds the corporation and its organs not to thwart the reasonable 
expectations of all other corporate constituencies. In the long run, implementing trust 
in the interactions with shareholders and all other constituencies will serve everyone’s 
best interests and, as a by-product, will be in the interest of residual claimants, saving 
agency costs and inducing risk-taking and cooperation by all the constituencies 
involved in the corporate community.84
Finally, the concept of trust, as a comprehensive theory of contract law and its 
application to corporate contracts, is the best prescriptive theory of corporate law 
because of its promising potential in helping to attain the long sought goals of 
corporate law: internalizing an atmosphere of trust. This is the best atmosphere for 
protecting investors and assisting them to maximize value by inducing corporate 
constituencies to incur risks and cooperate. Because each contract constitutes the most 
prevalent form of social and economic engagement, raising expectations, and inviting 
mutual trust, it can be used to reinforce a culture of trust both locally and globally 
when dealing with multinational corporations, with global contracts and with global 
84
 Compare: Manuel Beccerra and Anil K Gupta Trust within the Organization: Integrating the Trust 
Literature with Agency Theory and Transaction Costs Economics 23 Public Administration 
Quarterly (1999) 177-203.
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constituencies. Further research, which will be based on this view and will use 
corporate contracts as a universal leverage for attaining trust, might supply promising 
outcomes. An interesting point of departure could be the Israeli experience,85 which 
makes, as shown, rather extensive use of the “good faith” doctrine of contract law in 
corporate contractual constituencies, stressing their implicit obligation to fulfill the 
reasonable expectations of all corporate players.86 Any breach of “good faith” 
obligations by corporate organs, namely, any breach of the trust that was placed in 
them, exposes them to financial damages that, in turn, and especially when involving 
a stigma and expressive rhetoric, help to internalize loyal behavior and improve the 
broader “business culture” of trust.
IV. Concluding Notes –The Interrelationship  between Contract Law, Business 
Corporation and Society
The fundamental characteristics of a business corporation, just like the most common 
and trivial contract, are based on reciprocity and trade of future promises. Contractual 
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 See Infra Part II.
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 Sec. 205 – “Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its 
performance and its enforcement”. The comments to sec. 205 state: 
a. Meanings of ‘good faith’… The phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety of contexts, and its 
meaning varies somewhat with the context. Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract 
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with the justified 
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as 
involving ‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness. The appropriate remedy for a breach of the duty of good faith also varies with the 
circumstances…
d.  Good faith performance. Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in 
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But the obligation goes 
further: bad faith may be overt or may consist of inaction, and fair dealing may require more than 
honesty. A complete catalogue of all types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are 
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of the spirit of the 
bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering of imperfect performance, abuse of 
a power to specify terms, and interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party’s 
performance..” (Emphasis added – E.B.)
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attributes of this type, that are oriented toward future contingent actions and 
cooperative behavior, immanently generate expectations and involve risk.87 The 
business corporation, as a nexus of ongoing contracts which must be coordinated, thus 
easily illustrates the nature of human being as a “social animal” “who can only satisfy 
most of their needs by means of coordinated and cooperative activities” and as a 
result, the significance of trust in this context.88
Contract law - which is justified by the concept of trust - is the legal device that 
regulates this voluntary social and economical interaction. The linkage between the 
attributes of the concept of trust as a social convention on the one hand, and contract 
as a legal concept on the other hand, is that both are aiming to reach similar universal 
goals of cooperation, risk- taking, and fulfillment of reasonable expectations.
Accordingly, and as “cultures grow up out of the countless small choices of millions 
of people,”89 we can view specific contract in a given society not merely as  “private” 
and “micro” interaction, but rather as a subset of a broader social, macro, and cultural 
aspects of common trust. 
       More significantly, if one can see the potential role of contract law, including its 
“good faith” doctrine, as a compliance device serving to symbolize, build and 
internalize a culture of trust in any routine interaction, so is the case especially in the 
complex contractual interactions entailed by the corporate activity.  
87
 Remember that the “expectation” interest is the basic interest protected by contract law, see text to 
Supra notes 28-31.
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 J. Q. Wilson Human Remedies for Social Disorders 131 The Public Interest (1998) 25, 35.
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Since our daily lives are largely determined by the existence, activities, and 
ideology of large corporations,90 the corporate phenomenon—as a community 
reflecting a web of ongoing contracts—can serve a significant role in guiding society 
toward a culture of trust. As the mere existence of corporations and their ability to 
obtain capital and other resources are heavily dependent on the expectations they 
generate in those who are asked to interact with them (e.g., shareholders, creditors, 
employees, vendors, and customers), corporations have substantial incentives to 
create expectations, together with a direct and utilitarian incentive to actually fulfill 
them, thereby remaining attractive to the parties they transact with, and as a 
consequence, ensuring their survival, growth, and profitability. The business 
corporation, then, is a substantial social driver in our society, which creates and 
fosters an atmosphere of trust and not only benefiting from it. 
In a generation that is characterized by expansion and globalization of 
corporations and investors, it is readily evident how these notions can be extended 
across countries and cultures whereas the corporate entity would assume an active 
role as a trust creator at the international level.91
In conclusion, it is evident that a culture of trust—as reinforced by any contract, 
and even more so by a nexus of contracts—will not only contribute to the prosperity 
of a specific transaction or an entity but also to the society as a whole.
90
 See, for example the discussion in J.E. Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibilities – Issues 
in the Theory of Company Law (Oxford University Press, 1993) Chapter 1.
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  The ambition to promote a culture of trust in the international trade can be found also in section 7(1) 
to the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980) which 
was signed in Vienna on April 11, 1980 (“In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to 
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance 
of good faith in international trade” – emphasis added).  Moreover, in the virtual age of e-commerce, 
the crucial and universal significance of trust is more pronounced than ever before, compare: T. 
Frankel Trusting and Non-Trusting on the Internet 81 Boston University L. Rev. (2001) 457..
